NATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY PLAN TEMPLATE

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview of the NASP¹

is committed to enhancing aviation safety and to the resourcing of supporting activities. The purpose of this national aviation safety plan (NASP) is to continually reduce fatalities, and the risk of fatalities, through the development and implementation of a national aviation safety strategy. A safe, resilient and sustainable aviation system contributes to the economic development of and its industries. The NASP promotes the effective implementation of safety oversight system, a risk-based approach to managing safety, as well as a coordinated approach to collaboration between and other States, regions and industry. All stakeholders are encouraged to support and implement the NASP as the strategy for the continuous improvement of aviation safety.

The NASP of (ICAO) Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) and the

is in alignment with the International Civil Aviation Organization

1.2 Structure of the NASP

This NASP presents the strategic direction for the management of aviation safety at the national level for a period of years. It comprises six sections. In addition to the introduction, sections include: the purpose of the NASP, strategic direction for the management of aviation safety, the national operational safety risks identified for the NASP, organizational challenges addressed in the NASP, and a description of how the implementation of the safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) listed in the NASP is going to be monitored.

1.3 Relationship between the NASP and the State safety programme (SSP)

[The paragraph below only applies to States without mature safety data analysis (SDA) aspects of the SSPIA]

This NASP addresses operational safety risks presented in the ICAO GASP and the , in the absence of mature safety data analysis (SDA) aspects, as described in the ICAO State Safety Programme Implementation Assessment (SSPIA) in . Initiatives listed in this NASP address organizational challenges and aim to enhance organizational capabilities related to effective safety oversight.

or

[The paragraph below only applies to States with mature SDA aspects of the SSPIA]

Through the safety data analysis (SDA) aspects of the State safety programme (SSP), as described in the ICAO SSP Implementation Assessment (SSPIA), has the ability to use its hazard identification and safety risk management

¹. Section 1.1 may also be presented as a stand-alone foreword.

process as a source of safety intelligence to identify hazards and safety deficiencies, and determine national operational safety risks and organizational challenges for inclusion in the NASP. The SSP provides safety information to the NASP. The SSP allows to manage its aviation activities in a coherent and proactive manner, measure the safety performance of its civil aviation system, monitor the implementation of the NASP's SEIs and address national safety issues. The NASP is one of the key documents produced as part of 's SSP documentation. It is the means by which defines and drives the implementation of SEIs determined through SSP processes and drawn from the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161) and the . It also allows to determine initiatives to strengthen the SSP or otherwise needed to achieve its safety objectives. Safety intelligence gathered through the SSP also contributes to other national plans. Further information on 's SSP can be found at

1.4 Responsibility for the NASP development, implementation and monitoring

The is responsible for the development, implementation and monitoring of the NASP, in collaboration with and with the national aviation industry. The NASP was developed in consultation with national operators and other key aviation stakeholders, and in alignment with the of the GASP and the

1.5 National safety issues, goals and targets

The NASP addresses the following national safety issues:

- 1)
- 2)
- 3)

To address the issues listed above and enhance aviation safety at the national level, the NASP contains the following goals and targets:

- 1)
- 2)
- 3)

1.6 Operational context

, including There are certified aerodromes in international aerodromes. The airspace of is classified into Class . There were movements in over the period of to . There are currently air operator certificates (AOCs) issued by , and of those there are issued to operators conducting international commercial air transport operations. operators, which operate domestic air taxi services, primarily on turboprop aircraft, as well as helicopter operators. There are heliports in . Common hazards and safety deficiencies in include:

SECTION 2. PURPOSE OF

'S NATIONAL

AVIATION SAFETY PLAN

The NASP is the master planning document containing the strategic direction of). This plan lists national safety issues, the management of aviation safety for a period of years (to sets national safety goals and targets, and presents a series of safety enhancement initiatives (SEIs) to achieve those goals. Other national plans were considered in the development of the NASP, including the following: The NASP has been developed using the safety goals and targets and high-risk categories of occurrences (HRCs) from . These are highlighted in the text, where applicable. both the GASP (www.icao.int/gasp) and the The SEIs listed in the NASP support the improvement of safety at the wider regional and international levels. The NASP includes several actions to address specific safety issues and recommended SEIs for individual States set out in the adopted these SEIs and has included them plan. Cross-references provided to the for individual SEIs where relevant.

SECTION 3.

'S

STRATEGIC DIRECTION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AVIATION SAFETY

[The paragraph below only applies to States without mature SDA aspects of the SSPIA]

| risks (OPS) roadmaps, as presented in the ICA | 9 | izational challenges (ORG) and operational safety y Roadmap (Doc 10161), as well as State-specific |
|---|--------|---|
| issues identified by | | |
| This plan is developed and maintained by | | , in coordination with key aviation |
| stakeholders and is updated at least every | years. | |
| or | | |

[The paragraph below only applies to States with mature SDA aspects of the SSPIA]

| The NASP presents the SEIs ma | inly determined through SSP processes, including | 's |
|----------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| hazard identification and safety | risk management process and its SDCPS, as well as the | ne work undertaken by service |
| providers in the development ar | nd implementation of their safety management systems | (SMS). This plan is developed |
| and maintained by | , in coordination with | n key aviation stakeholders and |
| is updated at least every | years. | |

The NASP includes the following national safety goals and targets for the management of aviation safety, as well as a series of indicators to monitor the progress made towards their achievement. They are tied to the goals, targets and indicators listed in the GASP and the and include additional national safety goals, targets and indicators.

| Goal | Target | Indicators | Link to GASP and RASP |
|------|--------|------------|-----------------------|
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| 1. | | | |
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| 2. | | | |
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| Goal | Target | Indicators | Link to GASP and RASP |
|------|--------|------------|-----------------------|
| 3. | | | |
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| 4. | | | |
| 4. | | | |
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| 6 | | | |
| 6. | | | |
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The SEIs in this plan are implemented through 's existing safety oversight capabilities and the service providers' safety management systems (SMS). SEIs derived from the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161) were identified to achieve the national safety goals presented in the NASP. Some of the national SEIs are linked to overarching SEIs at the regional and international levels and help to enhance aviation safety globally. The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.

The NASP also addresses emerging issues, which include concepts of operations, technologies, public policies, business models or ideas that might impact safety in the future, for which insufficient data exists to complete a typical data-driven analysis. Due to the lack of data, emerging issues cannot automatically be considered as operational safety risks. It is important that remain vigilant on emerging issues to identify hazards and safety deficiencies, collect relevant data and proactively develop mitigations to address any associated risks. The NASP addresses the following emerging issues, which were identified by

for further analysis:

1)

2)

3)

SECTION 4. NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

The NASP includes SEIs that address national operational safety risks, derived from lessons learned from occurrences and from a data-driven approach. These SEIs may include actions such as rule-making, policy development, targeted safety oversight activities, safety data analysis and safety promotion. Separate sections are provided to address commercial air transport and general aviation to make the information more accessible to stakeholders.

publishes an Annual Safety Report, available on the

website . The summary of accidents and serious incidents that occurred in , and those for aircraft registered in involved in commercial air transport and aircraft involved in general aviation, is shown in the tables below. Year Fatal accidents Non-fatal accidents Serious incidents Commercial air transport occurrences in General aviation aircraft occurrences in Year Fatal accidents Non-fatal accidents Serious incidents Occurrences involving commercial air transport aircraft registered in Occurrences involving general aviation aircraft registered in The following national high-risk categories of occurrences (N-HRCs) in the were considered of the utmost priority because of the number of fatalities and risk of fatalities associated with such occurrences. They were identified based on analyses from mandatory and voluntary reporting systems, accident and

years, the SSP, as well as on the basis of

and on the operational

incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past

regional analysis conducted by

safety risks described in the GASP.

Appendix A to Chapter 4 4-App A-8 These N-HRCs are in line with those listed in the of the GASP, as well as the 1) 2) 3) In addition to the N-HRCs listed above, the following national operational safety risks have been identified: 1) 2) 3) The aviation occurrence categories from the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) were used to assess risk categories in the process of determining national operational safety risks. The CICTT Taxonomy is found on the ICAO website at https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/AIG/Pages/Taxonomy.aspx. To address the national operational safety risks listed above, identified the following contributing factors leading to N-HRCs and will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO OPS roadmap, contained in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161): N-HRC 1: 1) 2) 3) N-HRC 2: 1) 2) 3) N-HRC 3:

The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.

1)

2)

3)

SECTION 5. ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES

In addition to the national operational safety risks listed in the NASP, has identified organizational challenges and a series of SEIs, selected for the NASP, to address them. These are given priority in the NASP since they are aimed at enhancing and strengthening 's safety oversight capabilities and the management of aviation safety at the national level.

The eight critical elements (CEs) of a safety oversight system are defined by ICAO. is committed to the effective implementation of these eight CEs, as part of its overall safety oversight responsibilities, which emphasize 's commitment to safety in respect of its aviation activities. The eight CEs are presented in Figure 1 below.

The latest ICAO activities, which aim to measure the effective implementation of the eight CEs of 's safety oversight system, as part of the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP), have resulted in the following scores:




Figure 1. Critical elements of a State's safety oversight system

| Overall EI score | | | | | | | | |
|------------------|-------------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--|
| | % | | | | | | | |
| | EI score by CE | | | | | | | |
| CE-1 | CE-2 | CE-3 | CE-4 | CE-5 | CE-6 | CE-7 | CE-8 | |
| % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | |
| | EI score by audit area ² | | | | | | | |
| LEG | ORG | PEL | OPS | AIR | AIG | ANS | AGA | |
| % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | |

The following organizational challenges in the considered of the utmost priority because they impact the effectiveness of safety risk controls. They were identified based on analysis from USOAP data, accident and incident investigation reports, safety oversight activities over the past years, the SSP, as well as on the basis of regional analysis conducted by [list names of entities — For example, RASG, RSOO, PIRG and/or RAIO]. These issues are typically systemic in nature and relate to challenges associated with the conduct of States' safety oversight functions, implementation of SSP at the national level and the level of SMS implementation by national service providers. They take into consideration organizational culture, policies and procedures within and those of service providers. These organizational challenges are in line with those listed in the

1)

2)

3)

To address the organizational challenges listed above, will implement a series of SEIs, some of which are derived from the ICAO ORG roadmap, contained in the ICAO Global Aviation Safety Roadmap (Doc 10161). The full list of the SEIs is presented in the appendix to the NASP.

^{2.} Eight audit areas pertaining to USOAP, that is, primary aviation legislation and civil aviation regulations (LEG); civil aviation organization (ORG); personnel licensing and training (PEL); aircraft operations (OPS); airworthiness of aircraft (AIR); aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG); air navigation services (ANS); and aerodromes and ground aids (AGA).

SECTION 6. MONITORING IMPLEMENTATION

will continuously monitor the implementation of the SEIs listed in the NASP and measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system to ensure the intended results are achieved, using the mechanisms presented in the appendix to this plan.

In addition to the above, will review the NASP every years or earlier, if required, to keep the identified operational safety risks, organizational challenges and selected SEIs updated and relevant. The will periodically review the safety performance of the initiatives listed in the NASP to ensure the achievement of national safety goals. If required, will seek the support of to ensure the timely implementation of SEIs to address national safety issues. Through close monitoring of the SEIs, will make adjustments to the NASP and its initiatives, if needed, and update the NASP accordingly.

will use the indicators listed in Section 3 of this plan to measure safety performance of the national civil aviation system and monitor each national safety target. A periodic safety report will be published to provide stakeholders with relevant up-to-date information on the progress made in achieving the national safety goals, as well as the implementation status of the SEIs.

In the event that the national safety goals are not met, the root causes will be presented. If identifies critical operational safety risks, reasonable measures will be taken to mitigate them as soon as practicable, possibly leading to an unscheduled revision of the NASP.

adopted a standardized approach to provide information at the regional level and to report to the regional aviation safety group (RASG)

This allows the region to receive information and assess operational safety risks using common methodologies.

Any questions regarding the NASP and its initiatives, and further requests for information, may be addressed to the following:

Appendix to the NASP

DETAILED SEIS: NATIONAL OPERATIONAL SAFETY RISKS

| N-HRC | : | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------|-----------------------|--------------|---------|----------|---------------------|
| | Goal Target | : | | | | | |
| Safety enhancement initiative | Action | Timeline | Responsible entity | Stakeholders | Metrics | Priority | Monitoring activity |
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DETAILED SEIs: organizational challenges

| Organizatio | onal challenge | 1: | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------|-----------------------|--------------|---------|----------|---------------------|
| | Goal Target | : | | | | | |
| Safety enhancement initiative | Action | Timeline | Responsible entity | Stakeholders | Metrics | Priority | Monitoring activity |
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^{1.} One organizational challenge may be associated with multiple goals and/or targets.